Sudan's Bloody Secrets: Weaponized Conflict 💔🌍

World News

Sudan had been teetering on the brink of crisis for years prior to the open war that began in April 2023. Decades of authoritarian rule under Omar al-Bashir had created a fragile economy, fractured security forces, and deeply entrenched paramilitary structures. Following the 2019 coup that ousted al-Bashir, a delicate civilian-military transitional arrangement proved unable to unite the competing factions. Political instability, localized rebellions, and a growing rivalry between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—the successor to the Popular Defence Forces, a government-backed militia known as the Janjaweed who committed war crimes in Darfur in the early 2000s—escalated into full-scale conflict. By mid-2023, Sudan was effectively divided into contested zones, with major urban centers like Khartoum and Omdurman transformed into battlefields, and millions of civilians displaced internally or seeking refuge as refugees across borders. According to an EU official document cited by Deutsche Welle, the European Union stated: “The EU does not provide any financial support to the Government of Sudan… The Rapid Support Forces of the Sudanese military do not benefit directly or indirectly from EU funding.” This raises a critical question: Given the EU’s awareness of the potential for diversion, why did it still invest hundreds of millions into a context where control over the end use of training remained a significant concern?

The situation was further complicated by inadequate equipment and funding, and the European Union’s role extended beyond simply providing potentially vulnerable resources. The EU also supplied weapons, though indirectly. As the conflict intensified, investigators began uncovering a widespread circulation of foreign-manufactured weaponry among both the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Verified imagery, open-source analysis, and serial number tracing have revealed European-manufactured systems actively deployed on Sudan’s battlefields. In November 2024, Amnesty International released a report detailing that Nimr Ajban armored personnel carriers (APCs) were equipped with French-made Galix defensive systems. Amnesty’s analysts corroborated images and videos from multiple Sudanese locations, concluding that their deployment in Darfur would violate the longstanding United Nations arms embargo on the region. Furthermore, in April, investigations by France24 and Reuters news agency identified 81mm mortar shells found in an RSF convoy in North Darfur, tracing them back to Bulgaria. The markings on the ammunition matched mortar bombs manufactured by a Bulgarian firm and legally exported to the United Arab Emirates in 2019; however, the Bulgarian government did not authorize the re-export of these shells to Sudan. Finally, in October, The Guardian reported that British military equipment, including small-arms target systems and engine components for armored personnel carriers, had been utilized by the RSF in Sudan, with the UAE potentially implicated in the supply. Taken together, these findings reveal a discernible pattern.

European-made arms and weapons systems, legally exported to third countries, have been diverted into Sudan’s ongoing conflict, despite existing embargoes and safeguards. While the United Arab Emirates denies any involvement, its role as an intermediary hub for the re-export of weaponry has been repeatedly documented. Nevertheless, European suppliers, obligated by end-user agreements and established export-control frameworks, bear a responsibility to ensure compliance. Under United Kingdom and EU regulations, governments are required to deny or revoke licenses when a clear risk of diversion to conflict zones or human rights abusers is identified. The utilization of European-made arms and weapons systems in Sudan necessitates a rigorous reassessment of post-shipment monitoring and enforcement measures. Recent data reveals that the UK approved approximately $227 million in military exports to the UAE between April and June of this year, despite being informed that Emirati-supplied equipment had reached the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This situation is not unique, as numerous European countries have failed to adequately ensure their weapons are not diverted to war zones under embargo. For instance, South Africa has faced criticism regarding its control over arms shipments. Specifically, in the mid-2015, the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) faced international and domestic scrutiny after South African-manufactured weapons and ammunition were reportedly utilized by Saudi and Emirati forces in Yemen. Consequently, in 2019, the NCACC delayed or withheld export approvals.

Especially concerning “the most lethal” items, disputes arose over updated inspection clauses and growing human rights concerns. South African authorities insisted on gaining access to facilities within importer countries to verify compliance with end-user agreements – a demand that the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, alongside several other nations, categorically refused to honor. By 2022, previously withheld shipments were ultimately cleared following renegotiated terms. Current evidence indicates that South African weapons may have been diverted to Sudan; investigators and open-source analysts have reportedly identified munitions consistent with South African manufacture within the country. This case highlights the difficulty of enforcing compliance with end-user agreements for arms sales, even when there is demonstrated political will to do so.